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CRIMINAL COERCION AND FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
Kent Greenawalt*
This essay about constitutional limits on criminal coercion concerns a piece of a larger puzzle; how freedom of expression impinges on
crimes that involve communication. The essay has two interrelated
purposes. One is to reach some rather specific conclusions about the
kinds of coercive threats that enjoy constitutional protection and to
suggest how legislative formulations of criminal coercion can minimize
coverage of such threats. The second purpose, more general and theoretical, is to show how the boundaries of freedom of expression can be
understood and how courts can employ those boundaries to arrive at
specific tests of constitutional protection. The theory is brought to bear
to resolve the practical questions, and the answers to the practical questions provide one very important test of the soundness of the theoretical
claims.
A major reason for my choice to address criminal coercion is a
recent decision by the Oregon Supreme Court, State v. Robertson, 1 that
invalidates a statute forbidding that activity. The opinion, written by
Hans A. Linde, who is a leading first amendment scholar, concentrates
on the broad language chosen by the Oregon legislature, but his reasoning casts doubt on the validity of provisions in many other states,
including Illinois.2 Before Robertson, most courts had paid little attention to free speech problems with such statutes, assuming that criminal .
coercion is not expression that is constitutionally protected. Robertson,
by contrast, undertakes an extensive analysis of how definitions of
criminal coercion can touch protected speech and culminates in a judg• I am grateful to my colleagues Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt, who provided very valuable comments on an earlier draft, and to Vince Blasi, who subjected two different drafts to penetrating and thorough criticism. At a discussion of the paper, members of the law faculty of the
University of Chicago made perceptive challenges to my claims and helpful suggestions about
organization. The comments of other participants at the Northwestern Symposium on March 12,
1983, contributed substantially to my final efforts at revision. Without the urging of those who
organized the Symposium, the essay would not have been written. I greatly appreciate the research assistance of Stephanie Rasines and John Orenstein.
I State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982).
2 The opinion implicitly recognized the tension between its own approach and the recent
construction of the Illinois "Intimidation Statute" in People v. Hubble, 81 Ill. App. 3d 560, 401
N.E.2d 1282 (1980). State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 424-27, 649 P.2d at 583-85 (referring to People
v. Hubble explicitly at 293 Or. at 426 n.20, 649 P.2d at 584 n.20).
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ment that the statute's overbreadth renders it invalid under the Oregon
Constitution. My major criticism of the opinion is that it is insufficiently attentive to the borderlines of expression, that it assumes too
easily that a broad range of communications covered by the statute is
expression of the kind that the state or federal constitution protects.
My own analysis begins by identifying the major constitutional issues presented by the crime of criminal coercion. A summary of the
reasons given by the Oregon court for invalidating that state's criminal
coercion statute follows. I then provide a brief general explanation of
why certain kinds of communications fall outside the ambit of constitutional coverage, and why others, though within that coverage, can warrant less protection than the kinds of communications that lie at the
core of free expression. This introduction is followed by a more concentrated attempt to apply the underlying theory to the problem of
criminal coercion. Finally, I offer some remarks on how the perspectives I suggest might affect statutory drafting and judicial construction
of existing legislation.
CRIMINAL COERCION AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
THE BASIC ISSUES

The challenged Oregon statute3 made it a crime to compel or induce a person to do something that he has a legal right not to do (or to
abstain from doing something that he has a legal right to do) by making the victim fear that if he does not satisfy the demand, the person
making the threat or someone else will inflict one of a number of specified harms. The harms included causing physical injury or property
damage, engaging in criminal conduct, accusing someone of a crime,
causing strikes or boycotts, testifying or providing information about a
3 OR. REV. STAT. §163.275 (1981) provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of coercion when he compels or induces another person to
engage in conduct from which he has a legal right to abstain, or to abstain from engaging in
conduct in which he has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the
demand is not complied with, the actor or another will:
(a) Cause physical injury to some person; or
(b) Cause damage to property; or
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
(d) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against
him; or
(e) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject
some person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
(f) Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some person's business, except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or
(g) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to
another's legal claim or defense; or
(h) Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner
as to affect some person adversely; or
(i) Inflict any harm which would not benefit the actor.
(2) Coercion is a Class C felony.
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legal claim, using or abusing one's position as a public servant to affect
someone adversely, exposing a secret or publicizing an asserted fact
likely to produce hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and causing any other
harm that will not benefit the actor. The actual offense in Robertson
involved coercion of sexual conduct upon a threat to expose an embarrassing secret.4
The basic elements of the crime were two: (1) the actor's attempting to get another to perform any of a wide range of acts by means of
any of a wide range of threats; and (2) the yielding to the actor's threat
by the person threatened. The ambit of threats and demanded actions
was far wider than that covered by the traditional crimes of blackmail
or extortion, to which criminal coercion bears a marked resemblance. 5
Moreover, though the completed crime required successful coercion,
Oregon's general provision on attempts6 reached unsuccessful efforts to
coerce. A purpose to coerce by threat was apparently required for a
completed crime7 or an attempt, but an actual intent to carry out the
threat was not necessary for either form of liability.
The statute effectively poses three basic constitutional questions:
(1) Are coercive threats, almost always accomplished by verbal or written communication, genuinely expression in all or some instances?; 8 (2).
4 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 434, 649 P.2d at 589. The dissenting court of appeals opinion
in State v. Paige, 55 Or. App. 519, 522, 638 P.2d 1173, 1175 (1982) (en bane), indicated the facts
with more specificity: four men told a young woman they would send a picture of her having
sexual relations to her parents unless she performed oral sodomy on them.
5 The court regarded the statute's breadth as highly significant. State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at
421-22, 433-35, 649 P.2d at 581-82, 588-89.
6 See OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405(1) (1981). Defining attempt in terms of "a substantial step
toward commission of the crime." OR. REV. STAT.§ 161.425 (1981) precludes factual impossibility as a defense. An attempt to commit a Class C felony, such as coercion, is a Class A misdemeanor. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405(2)(d) (1981).
7 Although the language of the section is not transparently clear, I assume that when one
"compels or induces" action "by means of instilling . . . a fear," one has as a purpose that the
other person engage in the action, and that the threat is made to further that purpose. It may be
arguable that one could be guilty even though knowing or reckless as to either of these elements;
the language plainly precludes liability for negligence. In this Article, I shall not address the extra
constitutional issues that might be posed by a statute of this sort that created liability for reckless
or negligent utterances. The section of the Oregon penal law that deals generally with mental
culpability is OR. REV. STAT.§ 161.115 (1981); and the coercion provision would be construed in
light of that general section.
8 We can identify at the outset two different claims that freedom of expression touches the
statute's application. One possibility is that the act of threatening is itself within the realm of
expression, regardless of the harm threatened. On this broad view, ifl say to the Dean, "Give me
a better office or I'll throw stones and break the library windows,'' the threat alone brings freedom
of speech into play. The second conceivable locus of concern involves the threatened act. To
"publicize an asserted fact," will often be to exercise a right of free speech. Threats to engage in
free speech might possibly raise free speech problems even if other threats do not. These problems
would trouble only those applications of a statute in which the threatened act involved communication, but analogous concerns might be raised by threats to exercise other constitutional rights;
the threats might receive protection because of the protection afforded the threatened acts. My
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If so, to what extent do they actually enjoy constitutional protection?;

and (3) Does constitutional protection of some covered threats make
invalid a statute that reaches unprotected threats as well?
Blackmail, extortion, and criminal coercion are not the only common crimes that usually involve communication. Communication is a
necessary or an almost inevitable element, for example, in perjury, in
larceny that depends on trick or fraud, and in solicitation; and it usually plays a part in armed robbery. Punishment for these activities has
not been thought to raise serious constitutional difficulties. Yet, if anything constitutes speech, it is explicit verbal and written communications. Has everyone been blind to genuine free speech difficulties? One
possible solution to this puzzle is that every statutory definition of a
crime that implicates communication, and perhaps every criminal conviction for activity that involves communication, should be subject to
heightened scrutiny, the state being required to show a "compelling interest" or some sort of "clear and present danger." Yet, the implausibility of this solution leads one to question whether every kind of
communicative utterance is speech of a sort that enjoys constitutional
protection, and also to question whether the state must meet a uniformly strict standard whenever it seeks to punish communication that
does lay some legitimate claim to constitutional protection.
How should courts address these questions? To oversimplify
mightily, one source of resolution may be history. Perhaps those who
adopted guarantees of free speech did not mean to include utterances
of certain general types or utterances made for particular forbidden
purposes. Another source may be the underlying rationales for protecting speech; these rationales may implicate some kinds of utterances
much more than others. A third source involves some general weighing of the harms and benefits of various kinds of communications.
This last source may be seen to include the second; but I want to mark
out the second because of its special narrow focus on the nature and
"speech value" of the communications. Neither of the latter two
sources need be considered as wholly incompatible with an historically
centered inquiry. Insofar as modem views about speech resemble those
accepted at the time the crucial provisions were enacted, a modem
philosophical or policy-oriented treatment can cast some light on the
likely purposes of the adopters; insofar as the adopters meant to leave
some play for changing perceptions of protected speech, giving direct
weight to philosophical or policy conclusions can be consistent with
that historical purpose.
own analysis suggests that the constitutional status of a threatened act is not relevant, so long as
the act is legally permitted.
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THE OREGON COURT'S APPROACH TO THE COERCION STATUTE

The court in Robertson reached its conclusion that the coercion
provision is overbroad in four critical steps. First, the court found that
the provision was not a forbidden legislative attempt simply to control
expression, but that the statute's interference with expression was sufficient to demand careful constitutional scrutiny. Second, the court assumed that the communications that the statute reached were relevant
expression, and that the Constitution protects these communications
unless they fall within some principled exception. Third, the court determined that the statute covered many constitutionally protected communications. Fourth, it decided that it could not, while remaining
faithful to the legislative purpose, reconstruct the provision to cure the
overbreadth of its language. I shall summarize each of these four steps.
The opinion did tie its conclusions to the language of the Oregon
Constitution,9 but the reader does not gather that the specific wording
of the relevant provision is crucial to the outcome. Though a provision's exact language can be very important to a state court's efforts to
construe its own constitution, I do not focus on that here because my
effort is to provide a coherent account that could apply to the federal
and most state constitutional protections of speech.
The Statute as a Regulation of Speech Requiring Overbreadth Review

The Oregon Supreme Court, adopting a position that Justice
Linde earlier proposed in his academic writings, 10 had previously held
that the constitutional guarantee of free expression precludes legislative
prohibitions of expression itself. 11 As the opinion in Robertson puts the
point, no law is valid that is:
written in terms directed to the substance of any "opinion" or any "subject" of communication, unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some historical exception that was well established when the
first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that
the guarantees then or ·in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to
reach. 12

Because the coercion statute was aimed at forbidden effects and not at
"speech as such," the court concluded that its enactment was not whol9 See State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 431-33, 649 P.2d at 587-88. The Oregon Constitution,
like those of most other states, does not simply replicate the speech and press clauses of the federal
first amendment. It provides: "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion,
or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person
shall be responsible for the abuse of this right." OR. CONST. art. I, § 8.
10 See Linde, "Clear and Present ])anger" Reexamined· JJissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1183-85 (1970).
11 State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 611 P.2d 1147 (1980).
!2 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 412,649 P.2d at 576. The Oregon Constitution became effective in 1859.
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ly withdrawn from legislative authority. 13 But the court did not accept
the position taken by a majority in the court of appeals in this and a
related case that the constitutional guarantee had no significant bearing
on the statute. 14 The lower court had reasoned that the provision resembled other definitions of crimes that might "incidentally involve
communication" 15 and that what it forbade was "the conduct of compelling another to act" 16 or "the act of overpowering another's will." 17
According to Justice Linde, the relation between the statute and speech
was much more than incidental because "speech often would be the
offender's only act in committing this crime"; 18 "because speech is a
statutory element in the definition of the offense, the statute is susceptible to attack for possible overbreadth." 19
Statutorily Defined Threats as Potentially Protected Communications

The court in Robertson started with a vital premise, that communications of threats are speech within the understanding of constitutional
protections of speech. That is not to say that all threats are actually
protected; the court never suggests this, but the premise does imply that
the threats are protected unless for some reason they fall outside the
ambit of constitutional coverage. From the perspective of this essay,
this premise is the most important aspect of the court's approach; the
court apparently regarded the premise as self-evident, since the court
accepted it without examination. Given this starting point, the court's
aim was to compare the threats reached by the statute with the extent of
constitutional protection; and Justice Linde devoted his major analytic
efforts and marshalling of prior cases to this task.
The Overbreadth

ef Oregon's Coercion Provision

The court noted that under the statute neither the threatened action nor the conduct demanded of the victim need themselves be
wrongful, and that included among the kinds of threatened action are
exercises of constitutional privilege and of legal duty. 20 According to
the court, the statutory language reached many threats that obviously
enjoy constitutional protection, threats such as: "If you don't quit mak13 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 415,649 P.2d at 578. The opinion passed without mention of
the question whether the legislature's prohibition of attempted coercion is directed at speech as
such. That general problem is discussed iefra text accompanying notes 98-102.
14 State v. Robertson, 54 Or. App. 630,635 P.2d 1057 (1981); State v. Paige, 55 Or. App. 519,
638 P.2d 1173 (1982)(en bane).
15 State v. Robertson, 54 Or. App. at 633, 635 P.2d at 1059. The court mentioned robbery as
an example of a crime that might incidentally involve co=unication.
16 Id.
17 State v. Paige, 55 Or. App. at 522, 638 P.2d at 1174.
18 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 416, 649 P.2d at 578.
19 Id. at 415, 649 P.2d at 578.
20 Id. at 418, 649 P.2d at 579-80.
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ing love to my wife, I'm going to tell your wife"; and "Change your
opinion, or I shall dissent and expose your complete ignorance of this
area of the law."21 The central issue was whether the statute could be
given "a principled interpretation that excludes its application to these
and other instances of free expression."22
Neither the court's review of prior decisions nor its own analysis
produced sharp guidelines for when threats can and when they cannot
be punished. The largely inconclusive survey of precedents both highlighted relevant factors and foreclosed simple-minded answers to the
question of what threats can be punished. The court did assume that
the traditional crimes of blackmail and extortion involving attempts "to
obtain money or other things of value" are constitutionally punishable;23 and the principle permitting punishment of threats in those instances was seen as broad enough to reach extortion of sexual favors.
The court cited cases in other jurisdictions that have sustained extortion statutes against free speech challenges as resting on this basis;24
and Justice Linde's opinion assumed that Oregon's own extortion statute, which concerns compulsion to obtain property, is valid, even
though it covers exactly the same threatened consequences as the coercion provision.25 The latter's blanket coverage of all conduct or failures to engage in conduct that are within the legal rights of the victim,
however, extends its reach to arguably protected threats. 26
The court regarded the failure of the legislature to limit the statute
to private communications as a further problem.27 Supreme Court
cases establishing rights for demonstrators whose aim is to induce action were viewed as implying a constitutional right to threaten to
demonstrate. 28 The court read Watts v. United States, 29 which involved
21 Id. at 418-19, 649 P.2d at 580.
22 Id. at 419, 649 P.2d at 580.
23 Id. at 421, 649 P.2d at 581.
24 Id. at 422-23, 649 P.2d at 582 (discussing Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 874 (1980); State v. Felton, 339 So. 2d 797 (La. 1976)). The results in these cases
may also be taken to indicate that threats may be punished when they are part of an otherwise
illegal endeavor, such as a lawyer's solicitation of business or a policeman's abuse of office. State
v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 423, 649 P.2d at 582.
25 See State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 421-22, 649 P.2d at 581; OR. REV. STAT.§ 164.075 (1981).
26 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 434-35, 649 P.2d at 589. The court suggested that constitutional privileges are broader when people demand that others refrain from turning over property
or engaging in sexual conduct than when they demand that property or sexual favors be given. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 428-31, 649 P.2d at 585-87 (discussing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)). The Robertson opinion criticized state and federal decisions that upheld a conviction for extortion based on a
threatened and actual picketing designed to induce contributions to the Black Panther Party. See
Moore v. State, 519 S.W.2d 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974); Moore v. Newell, 401 F. Supp. 1018,
1021 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), ajjd, 548 F.2d 671, 672 (6th Cir. 1977). These decisions were thought to
rest on too narrow a view of the constitutional rights to picket and to threaten to picket. State v.
Robertson, 293 Or. at 427-28, 649 P.2d at 585.
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a hyperbolic threat to kill the President, as supporting the proposition
that "[v]erbal threats to take or initiate even unlawful, violent action
are not beyond first amendment protection by their content alone, divorced from any imminent realization." 30
Justice Linde noted that in Landry v. Daley,3 1 a case brought by
blacks attacking the Illinois Intimidation Statute as impinging on protected activities of direct action, the court was sufficiently troubled by
constitutional difficulties to construe the statute narrowly to cover only
threats of actions that themselves would be illegal in some sense and,
even then, said that the statute could not be applied to threats of minor
offenses, such as blocking a street or engaging in disorderly conduct. 32
For the court in Robertson, Landry represents rejection of the idea that
the state can uniformly prevent the immediate evil of the coercive effect
of a threat. 33 The Oregon court criticized the Landry opinion for its
failure to face the full implications of overbreadth analysis and focus
adequately on potential hypothetical applications of the statute.34
The Oregon court at one point suggested a variety of possible relevant elements for determinations about constitutional protection: (1)
the lawfulness of the demanded conduct, (2) the nature of the
threatened conduct, (3) the aim and motive of the person making the
threat, (4) the relationship of the parties to the demand or the
threatened consequences, (5) the relationship between the demand and
the threatened consequences, (6) the means of expression employed in
the demand or threat, (7) the likelihood and imminence of the
threatened acts, and (8) other distinctions in the social setting or function of the demand. 35 Given its generous view of the scope of constitutional privilege, the court did not have to achieve more precise
constitutional delineation to conclude that the broad statutory language
did reach many threats that are protected against criminal penalties.
The Inappropriateness

of Judicial Reconstruction of the Statute

Having gotten this far, the court's remaining work was fairly simple. In contrast to the wide privileges in the Model Penal Code provi394 U.S. 705 (1969).
State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 420, 649 P.2d at 580- 81. I do not think Watts bears such a
reading, as I indicate below. See iefra text accompanying note 67.
31 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
32 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 424-27, 649 P.2d at 583-85. An Illinois appellate court has
construed its statute much more broadly to reach threats of actions that are not illegal. People v.
Hubble, 81 Ill. App. 3d 560, 401 N.E.2d 1282 (1980).
33 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 426, 649 P.2d at 584.
3 4 Id. at 426-27, 649 P.2d at 584-85. The court similarly criticized a federal decision sustaining
New York's coercion statute against an overbreadth attack, Bishop v. Golden, 302 F. Supp. 502
(E.D.N.Y. 1969). State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 423-24, 649 P.2d at 583.
35 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 420, 649 P.2d at 581.
29

30
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sion on coercion, 36 the Oregon drafters chose to create a privilege only
for threats to charge someone with a crime, and only then when the
person making the threat believes the charge and the demand is that
the person who committed the crime take reasonable action to make
good his wrong. 37 In order to narrow the statute sufficiently to cure its
overbreadth, the court would have either had to write in specific exclusions the drafters did not wish to include, an exercise that would trespass on the legislative function, or to create an open-ended exception
for all instances of constitutionally protected communication, a formulation that would trade overbreadth for vagueness. Therefore, the
court declared the statute to be impermissibly violative of freedom of
expression; and left with the legislature the responsibility to draft a new
formulation that will pass muster.
COERCIVE THREATS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The discussion that follows is directed toward developing constitutional principles against which coercive threats, and statutes forbidding
coercive threats, may be assessed. It seeks to go beyond the Robertson
opinion, indicating with greater specificity which kinds of threats
should be regarded as constitutionally protected and what kinds of statutory standards should survive an overbreadth attack.
An important aspect of the analysis is the claim that many coercive threats simply lie outside the boundaries of free expression altogether. In a broad sense, every constitutional case can be said to raise a
boundary problem, requiring delineation of the coverage of the constitutional provision involved. Often, however, the general applicability
of a constitutional provision will not be in doubt; the only crucial issue
will be how it applies to the circumstances presented. 38 A case involves
boundaries in my narrower sense when the applicability of a constitutional provision is genuinely in question. 39 Boundary questions about
36 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(d) (1980). The Oregon court commented on the Model
Penal Code in State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 431,436, 649 P.2d at 587,590, but the court avoided
indicating whether the Model Code's privileges are sufficiently broad from a constitutional point
of view. The Model Code's privileges are discussed infra note 103.
37 See OR. STAT. REV. § 163.285 (1981).
38 For example, when the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971), arose, no one doubted that the first amendment sharply restricts injunctions against the
publication of news; what was uncertain was the criteria under which such injunctions might be
granted and whether those criteria had been met.
39 First amendment claims by policemen to choose the length of their hair, Kelley v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238 (1976), and by political demonstrators to commit trespass on public property, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1020 (1967), fall into this category. As
these two illustrations show, doubt about the amendment's applicability can arise either because
the activity regulated bears a remote relation to ordinary expression (the hair length example) or
because the grounds of the state's regulation have nothing to do with the expressive aspect of the
activity (the trespass example).
I should not wish to press this distinction between boundary cases and scope of application
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the first amendment are easiest to perceive when non-verbal conduct
that the government could ordinarily regulate is said to be infused with
expressive content; but boundary questions also arise in respect to some
verbal and written utterances,40 and it is these that I explore in some
depth. I want to stress that the threshold questions about the applicability of the first amendment and its state analogues can be critical.
Even when judges properly conclude that the guarantees are applicable, understanding why and how far they are relevant can be a major
step in resolving the manner in which they should be applied.
Were my conclusion that no coercive threats have anything to do
with free expression, the practical import of the exercise would be
straightforward. But my conclusion is more complicated. It is that
constitutional guarantees of free speech should be understood to touch
some kinds of coercive threats; even as to these, however, criminal punishment is appropriate in some circumstances. I attempt to distinguish
threats that are reached by basic notions of freedom of expression from
those that are not; to indicate when threats that fall within the boundaries of free speech may nonetheless be punished; and to suggest how
these theoretical distinctions can be transformed into workable statutory and judicial standards.
Lest the intracacies of the analysis deflect the reader from the
practical point of the e.ffort, I state my constitutional conclusions about
threats coupled with demands in summary form here. If the action that
is threatened is seriously wrongful, the threat may be punished. If the
threat coupled with the demand involves an abuse of authority, or a
direct denial of a civil right, it may be punished. If the demand is that
the person threatened perform a criminal action, the coercive threat
may be punished on the same basis as ordinary criminal solicitation.
Coercive threats that do not fit into these categories may still be punished if the threat is serious and firmly intended, and if the threatened
action is not a common, natural response to someone's failure to perform the action demanded. Legislative endeavors to criminalize coercases too hard. Assertions of both kinds are often intertwined; on occasion, what is essentially the
same substantive claim can be formulated in either way. Plainly, decisional law can alter the
circumstances in which the two kinds of assertions may plausibly be made. The first amendment
was once thought to have nothing to do with the law of ordinary libel, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (dictum); now cases tum on whether the plaintiff has surmounted
the applicable first amendment hurdles, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Still, the distinction is useful despite its fuzzy edges and the shifts in its application to the constitutional subject matter.
The distinction I draw for purposes of constitutional law is very close to the distinction Frederick Schauer elaborates between coverage of a right and protection of a right in his philosophical
analysis of freedom of expression. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92
(1982).
40 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 39, at 101-03; Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 645, 675-85.
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cive threats should concentrate, to the extent possible, on categorization
that captures the wrongfulness of demanded or threatened conduct.
When legislation seeks to reach other coercive threats it should create
privileges for threats of natural responses.
Freedom

of Expression and Varieties of Utterance

My general thesis is that human utterances differ tremendously in
their significance, and that the idea of freedom of expression applies
with much more force to some kinds of utterances than to others. To
some, it applies so weakly that such utterances should be considered
outside the scope of protected expression; other forms of utterance may
warrant a degree of protection, but less than that which is afforded to
the communications that fall most squarely within the rationales of free
expression.41 I shall here offer a brief and necessarily schematic summary of this thesis, developed more fully elsewhere,42 before proceeding to apply it to the problem of criminal coercion.
Philosophers of language have carefully analyzed a variety of
tasks that human communication accomplishes. Words are the main
technique by which we convey our ideas about facts and values. Yet,
they can also be the medium for doing certain things or attempting to
do certain things.
Given the law and the practices of social morality, the utterance of
some kinds of words in some kinds of circumstances actually changes
the settings in which we live. These utterances are situation-altering.
Sometimes the change in setting is symbolic. One who follows the
proper procedures can, for example, change his or her legal name.
Often the change is normative; the words we and others use directly
alter our obligations and rights. By speaking marriage vows or by signing adoption papers in the proper situations, a person can radically
change his or her legal relations with someone else. Agreements between people to perform certain acts often have legal force, and even
when they do not, they alter moral obligations. An offer to enter into
an agreement also alters the normative setting, because, unless and until it is revoked, the offer empowers the person to whom the offer is
made to close the agreement by his or her consent. Simple promises
also alter one's moral responsibilities; the person who makes a promise
undertakes a new obligation, or makes even stronger an obligation that
already exists.
Sometimes the use of words can alter the environment in which we
41 This general position is at odds with the views of scholars such as Martin Redish. See
Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). He argues that all communications to which free speech has application must be treated as equally valuable, with only the
degree of public need being appropriately weighed in decisions whether speech may be curtailed.
42 The ideas here summarized are developed at much greater length in Greenawalt, supra note
40, at 670-87, 729-77. See also F. SCHAUER, supra note 39, at 12-14, 89-112.
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find ourselves in a different way, by changing the pattern of external
responses to our behavior. I do not mean simply that our perception of
what will happen in response to our actions changes, since that will
often be true of novel information that affects our understanding of the
external environment. What I mean is stronger: that the external environment actually does change.43
Imagine that Eric arrives at the parking lot and learns that his car
has a flat tire. Eric knows he is incompetent at changing tires, and that
his equipment for the job is not good. He is also in a great hurry. He
notices a stranger, Betty, getting into her car and asks her if she will
please help him. Betty says "no." Eric is desperate and says, "I'll give
you $10 if you help me change this flat." Had Betty initially said ''yes,"
Eric would not have offered her any money, taking her aid as an instance of generous assistance that would be demeaned by an offer of
payment. Indeed, if Betty had said "yes" after Eric had decided to
make the offer but before he had actually done so, Eric would not have
said anything about payment. The possibility of payment here is dependent on Eric actually communicating.44 Until he makes that communication, the environment that Betty faces does not include the
opportunity to earn $10 by helping Eric change his tire.45 In this instance of an offer of payment, Eric's communication not only generates
the possibility of payment, but represents a proposed agreement that
Betty can close by saying "yes." The offer, therefore, changes Betty's
normative situation as well, allowing her unilateral action to bind Eric.
Suppose, instead, Eric had said, "If you don't help me change my
tire now, I will see that one of your own tires is punctured next time
you park in this lot." That communication does not alter Betty's normative situation; she has no new rights46 or duties. Nevertheless, assuming that Eric would not bother to puncture her tire unless he had
communicated the threat to her, the communication does actually alter
her environment, bringing into play a likely response to her conduct
43 Of course, one way in which the external environment can change is if the physical force of
words uttered breaks a glass or directly affects some other object, but that is not what I have in
mind.
44 More precisely, what is necessary is that Eric thinks he has communicated the offer. If Eric
thinks Betty has heard him and is responding to his offer of money, whereas in actuality she has
not heard the offer but has been brought around by guilt feelings to change her response to the
original plea for help, Eric will tender the $10 at the end of the job.
45 In a more complex sense, one could say that the environment does offer that opportunity,
since it includes the likelihood that Eric will offer the $10 and that subsequently Betty can earn the
$10. The point, however, is that the opportunity to earn $10 does not exist independent of the
offer-the offer itself is a necessary condition for the acquiring of the $10. (Of course, Betty could
be the first to raise that option and Eric could agree.)
46 If such a communication is actually tortious, then the recipient does have a new right to sue
the maker of the communication.

1092

78:1081 (1983)

Criminal Coercion

that did not previously exist. Such a communication is genuinely situation-altering.
Many kinds of communications are directly designed to get people
to perform actions. A simple request like "Please shut the door," or
"Please help me change this tire," is of this sort. These utterances are
action-inducing. Orders by those in authority are an obvious example.
Their direct aim is to get someone else to act, so they are action-inducing, but the authority of the person who issues the order gives that person the power to alter the subordinate's normative situation. The
subordinate now has a duty to do something he previously did not have
a duty to do. Moreover, if sanctions typically follow failure to obey an
order, the making of the order brings into play an adverse consequence
for failure to perform the ordered action that did not previously exist.
Thus orders are situation-altering as well as action-inducing. Eric's offer of money to Betty, and his alternative threat to puncture her tire,
are also both action-inducing and situation-altering.
Most requests among acquaintances are in one sense subtly situation-altering. One is often more disappointed when an explicit request
is refused than when, without any request, the other person fails to act
in one's interest. This disappointment may trigger hostility or withdrawal. So the request itself can affect the environment in which the
recipient of the request acts. The ordinary request, however, is not situation-altering in the direct and strong sense of an order or an offer of
payment.
Given that human utterances differ in their significance, the second part of my general thesis is that the reasons for constitutional protection of speech apply much more powerfully to assertions of fact and
value than they do to situation-altering utterances and action-inducing
utterances.47 A survey of the major social justifications for freedom of
expression might produce the following: discovery of truth; disclosure
and accommodation of competing interests and desires; exposure and
deterrence of abuses of authority; promotion of independent judgment;
development of personality and sense of self-worth; protection against
unwarranted infringements on autonomy and dignity.48 These justifi4 7 See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 670-87 for a fuller explanation. Of course, some of these
justifications do apply to a broad range of personal liberty, and freedom to engage in situation•
altering utterances and action-inducing utterances is an aspect of personal liberty generally; but
the distinctive forms of justification that apply to expression and not to liberty generally have
much less force in respect to these sorts of utterances.
My reference to assertions of fact and value is not meant to foreclose the possibility that other
forms of communication, particularly aesthetic, also should count as expression.
4 8 The sentence in the text reflects my view that no single justification adequately captures all
the philosophic reasons for freedom of expression nor should serve as the exclusive basis for development of constitutional doctrine. I do not here defend that view either against those who
conceive a single justification as narrowly circumscribing protected expression, see, e.g., Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INo. L. REV. l (1971), or against those
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cations are typically advanced with reference to assertions of fact and
value and are primarily relevant to those communications.49
The philosophical arguments for free expression that preceded or
were roughly contemporaneous with adoption of the first amendment
concerned assertions of fact and value, and reveal the framers' attention to communications of those types. The shared assumption that the
constitutional safeguard did not undercut the legitimacy of then-existing ordinary crimes, including crimes consisting mainly of communication, is further evidence that the framers did not perceive all
utterances as within the scope of freedom of speech.50 The texts that
afford constitutional protection of expression-the federal provision
speaks of "the freedom of speech"-hardly resolve whether all communications count as speech and how to divide those that count from
those that do not. Reliance on the rationales for protection is one
method for resolving doubts about categorization that cannot be resolved on the basis of the constitutional language itself. A judge or
critic can reasonably give weight to the social justifications for expression without trying to settle the respective places in constitutional interpretation of reliance on the text, historical intent, and reasoned
appraisal of social values. 51 Such an approach is also consonant with
the accretion of judicial decisions construing the relevant provisions;
many of these, explicitly or implicitly, employ such a strategy themselves and very few indeed indicate that it is inappropriate. 52
Whatever the intrinsic interest of distinctions among kinds of communications that are drawn with respect to the values of communication, any attempt to employ such distinctions for purposes of
who formulate a broad single justification capable of incorporating elements of various claims of
justification and of supporting wide protection of expression, see Redish, supra note 41, at 591.
4 9 See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 687-93.
50 A conclusion that the framers regarded some communications as not protected does not
itself settle how they conceived what was unprotected. The essential approach of the court in
Robertson is that all kinds of communications were presumptively protected against criminal penalties, but with such penalties being deemed acceptable for crimes already well established. My
approach suggests the possibility of generalizing from established crimes to noncoverage of certain
types of communication. Even to phrase the relevant question for historical intent, much less to
answer it, is extraordinarily difficult. Assuming that those whose intent counts meant to do more
than forbid prior restraints when the federal and Oregon provisions were adopted, and thus conceived the provisions as limiting subsequent criminal punishment in some degree, those who
thought about the subject supposed that punishment of existing ordinary crimes would not be
impaired. But few, if any, must have thought about the status of crimes to be created in the future
that would involve the same kinds of communications as the traditional crimes. One could put the
question in terms of what they would have supposed if they had had to address the question, and I
believe asking the question that way tends to support the preferability of my approach to that
adopted by the court in Robertson, but the answer to the question must remain highly conjectural.
51 This approach does reflect outright rejection of some conceivable, and implausible, theories
of interpretation, such as that one cannot go beyond the ordinary language meaning of the text.
52 I understand Robertson as a case that does indicate that in some respects the approach I
take is inappropriate.
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constitutional interpretation must face serious difficulties. One difficulty is that ideas about facts and values are often implicit in situationaltering and action-inducing utterances, so these forms of utterance can
have some value on that score. This conclusion is insufficient, however,
to warrant their treatment as expression. Ideas about facts and values
may be implicit in virtually all utterances; but such ideas are also implicit in many actions that do not involve communication at all. These
actions are not regarded as expression simply because some implicit
ideas can be gleaned from them. Since the dominant import of situation-altering utterances lies elsewhere than in their transmission of
ideas and since whatever implicit ideas they convey can be expressed in
many alternative ways, those utterances need not be treated like statements of fact and value. Action-inducing utterances (that are not also
strongly situation-altering) are more troublesome, since requests and
encouragements to act are often embedded in appeals to facts and values; and any warning about harmful consequences that will be produced by action is itself a statement of fact. Action-inducing utterances
lie at the margin of what the rationales for freedom of expression reach,
and such utterances warrant some degree of protection, but less than
that afforded ordinary claims of fact and value.
A second difficulty is that the lines demarcating types of utterances
are less clear-cut than I initially indicated. There may sometimes be
little difference in effect between saying "Please shut the door" (a request) and "The draft from that door is making me cold" (ostensibly a
statement of fact, but one that may be made solely to get someone else
to close the door). The existence of troublesome line-drawing problems
at the borders can be consistent with the presence of enough clear instances to make categorization worthwhile. If the borderline problems
are intrinsically too great, however, or afford unacceptable opportunities for officials to perpetrate abuses in individual cases or to systematically draw lines that are at odds with free speech values, then that
possible basis for classification must be abandoned.
I do not believe that either functional variations in a single form of
utterance or the typical presence of implicit content pose insurmountable barriers to the general effort I undertake, but these difficulties do
highlight very important cautions about the enterprise. Constitutional
rules of protection cannot be based on purely formal distinctions
among modes of utterance that are inattentive to the way the communications actually function; and if freedom of expression is to be highly
valued, substantial breathing room must be given for utterances that
significantly convey ideas, even while serving other functions.
Coercive Threats and Expression: Warnings, Simple Threats,
Manipulative Threats, and Warning Threats

I tum now to the application of my general thesis to the problem
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of criminal coercion. In this section I try to indicate with some clarity
which situations intrinsically raise freedom of expression difficulties
and which do not. For this purpose, I assume perfect knowledge about
relevant facts. Maintaining this assumption, I consider in the following
section the principles for deciding when communications may nevertheless be punished. I then drop the assumption of perfect knowledge
and discuss what are apt constitutional standards in light of the
problems of fact determination and line drawing that trouble the legal
process.

A.

Warnings

Wanda, a disinterested friend of Vicki's, is aware that Daniel is offended
by Vicki's involvement with drugs and is planning to report her to the
police. Wanda tells Vicki she is likely to be reported unless she does some
special favor for Daniel that will dissuade him from endangering her. As
a consequence, Vicki does a favor for Daniel.

Wanda's statement alters Vicki's perception of her environment, but
what Wanda has done is to inform Vicki of the environment that
Wanda actually believes to exist (and that does in fact exist) at the time
of Wanda's comment, an environment that has not been created by her
as part of any plan of hers to induce Vicki to act. What Wanda has
done is to give a warning.
If Wanda wants Vicki to avoid getting into trouble, her communication to Vicki might conceivably fall within the literal scope of the
Oregon statute passed on in Robertson. 53 Yet, what Wanda has done is
certainly not coercion of Vicki in any sense of the term. One person
coerces another by putting him under such great psychological pressure
that a rational decision is impossible, by creating unfair conditions of
choice, or by manipulating belief about relevant facts; informing someone of true but disquieting facts beyond one's control is clearly not to
coerce. Wanda's warning is not situation-altering, since it communicates about an environment that already exists. The warning is closely
analogous to a doctor's suggestion that dire consequences will ensue if
a patient fails to have an operation. Wanda may be trying .to induce
Vicki to act, but she has done so by affording Vicki information about
external facts that is highly important for her. Wanda's comments may
also be action-inducing, but they nonetheless clearly do involve freedom of expression. Indeed, the only conceivable doubt on this score
would be about whether private communications are reached by the
justifications for freedom of expression. Since much communication of
information and values occurs in private, the justifications plainly do
53 Wanda might be said to have "induced" Vicki to engage in conduct by "instilling in [her] a
fear" that otherwise "another will" accuse her of a crime. See OR. REY. STAT.§ 163.275(1) (1981)
(reproduced supra note 3). The statute also speaks of "the demand" not being "complied with,"
however, language that is not apt for a warning of a disinterested friend.
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reach private contexts. 54

B.

Simple Threats

Victor has broken off an affair with Tim's sister in a manner that convinces Tim that Victor has badly used his sister in their relationship.
Highly angered, Tim approaches Victor on the street and says, "One of
these days I'm going to kill you for what you did to my sister."

Tim has communicated to Victor a threat that is unaccompanied by
any indication of action by which Victor could avoid having the
threatened consequence befall him. The threat is "simple," merely stating what Tim's plans for the future are with respect to Victor. The
threat conveys factual information about Tim's present state of mind
and about likely subsequent events.55 If a third person warned Victor
that Tim planned to kill him, the justifications for free expression
would undoubtedly reach that communication. That principle has been
established in the discussion of warnings. Though Tim's purpose in
communicating may be quite different from the purpose that a third
party would be likely to have, the nature of the communication does
not radically change because Tim makes it himself. Whatever may be
the grounds for punishing them, simple threats cannot be placed
outside the ambit of expression.
C. Manipulative Threats
Tim wants to make love with Vicki. Realizing that his native charm is
inadequate for the task, Tim decides that success will depend on frightening Vicki. He knows that Vicki has recently had an abortion, that she
cares a great deal about her parents' opinion of her, and that her parents
regard abortion as a terrible wrong. Tim threatens that he will inform
Vicki's parents unless she makes love with him, and she complies.

Tim's communication undoubtedly changes the environment in which
Vicki perceives herself to be. She now supposes she faces a serious
danger of personal harm from Tim of which she was previously unaware. Tim's threat may involve a kind of promise that he will not report her activities if Vicki makes love with him, but the threat is mainly
a statement of fact about what Tim will do (and about what he presently intends to do) if Vicki refuses. Statements of fact are, of course,
generally within the realm of free expression, but this statement of fact
is special, whether or not Tim actually plans to carry out the threat if
Vicki refuses to comply.
5 4 See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 676-78; Schauer, "Private" Speech and the Private Forum:
Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1979 SUP. CT. RE.v. 217. The court in Robertson made
the same assumption and the assumption is supported by Supreme Court precedent, Givhan v.
Western Line School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979).
55 When future events are wholly within one's control, the distinction between a prediction of
future events and a statement of present intentions is thin to the point of nonexistence.
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The statement of fact may be false. Tim may be unprepared to tell
Vicki's parents about the abortion if the threat does not succeed. His
threat, then, would not actually change the dangers that Vicki faces;
rather the threat misleads her into thinking she faces a danger that in
reality does not exist. In that event, Tim's communication may be
placed outside the ambit of expression on the ground that intentionally
false statements (or at least most intentionally false statements) are not
reached by the justifications for free expression and do not warrant
protection. More might be said about why fraudulent statements do
not implicate the values of speech, but I shall pass on to the more interesting problem of the status of the communication if Tim does indeed
plan to carry out the threat.
I need first to make explicit some assumptions that so far are only
implicit in the example. We need to suppose that Tim is neither a devoted opponent of abortions, ready to expose all those who have them,
nor a believer in parents knowing everything their mature children are
up to. Tim would not even think of reporting the abortion to Vicki's
parents in the ordinary course of events, and further would not even
think of that as an apt response if, absent an initial threat, Vicki had
rebuffed his amorous advances. In short, the possibility of telling
Vicki's parents has come into existence only as a part of a plan to induce Vicki to act in a favorable way; and Tim's present willingness to
carry out the threat is the product of his aim to scare her into acting as
he wishes, combined with a desire to stick to his word or to make his
threats credible, or both.
If Tim had for some reason only been able to communicate his
wish to make love but not the threat, his reasons for telling her parents
would never come into existence. We might imagine, for example, that
Tim and Vicki speak different languages, and that Tim finds it much
easier to convey his desire for sexual relations than a threat to report
past behavior. If Tim did find himself unable to make Vicki understand the threat, he would see no point in carrying it out. The threat,
then, is itself genuinely situation-altering as well as action-inducing;
because only the actual making of the threat sets in place the conditions
for the unpleasant consequences of failure to comply. The event that
Tim predicts has been "created" as part of a plan to induce action,
having no independent existence except as part of an effort to coerce by
means of the threat. Tim has threatened to make what I call an unnatural response. His communication is not essentially an effort to inform,
but rather an effectuation of a change in Vicki's environment designed
to produce action that Tim desires. Because the communication is
strongly situation-altering, it lies outside the range of freedom of
expression.
Brief reflection on attempted bribery and other forbidden offers of
money helps illuminate this conclusion. One can try to motivate action
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by promising a reward or threatening a harm. An ordinary bribe is a
reward that is something more than a natural response to an action that
one has desired and requested. No one has supposed that an offer of a
bribe is within the range of freedom of expression, even when the person offering a bribe stands ready to pay off and thus is truly reporting
his planned behavior. Bribes typically involve some diversion of the
person bribed from his or her official responsibilities; but the point here
is broader. Though people can usually offer :financial rewards to others
to do things (indeed such offers are a central feature of modem economies), legislators have the power to decide that some subjects, such as
sexual favors or babies for adoption, are to be removed from the
:financial marketplace. Prohibitions of offers of money to purchase
these benefits have rightly not been thought to impinge on expression.
A restraint on threats like Tim's is similar in principle.
I shall use the term "manipulative threats" to refer to threats of
action when the actor would not suggest or engage in the action were it
not for the threat itself and its linkage to a demand. My position is that
these threats of unnatural responses, when deliberately made and
firmly intended, are not the sorts of communications covered by freedom of expression. If such a threat is false, it falls under the principle
that intentionally false information does not warrant protection; if such
a threat truly states the threatener's plans, its situation-altering character takes it outside the scope of expression.56
This position does not depend either on a judgment that the
threatened action itself is socially undesirable or on a judgment that the
threatened action combined with a demand is socially undesirable. In
many instances, the speaker may be threatening a socially desirable action, such as the report of a serious crime. Even the combination of the
threat with a demand may be socially appropriate. Parents may tell
children that specific consequences will follow particular misbehavior,
consequences that could not appropriately be imposed unless the children had been explicitly told about them in advance. Such threats may
also have some appropriate place in relations among adults. In some
instances, the ability to threaten consequences that themselves may
serve no one's interest may be a useful aspect of free bargaining. A
valuable professor, if faced with an administration that raises salaries
only when it fears losing someone, may reasonably threaten to leave for
a school at which he or she would actually be less happy. My point is
that because these tactics, like offers of payment, are situation-altering,
they are outside the range of free expression. When manipulative
56 In a very interesting paper, Richard Epstein argues that people are mistaken in viewing
blackmail as a kind of coercion, but that it is justifiably made criminal because of its tendency to
induce deceptions and other wrongs. R. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc. 27-28 (1982) (unpublished manuscript). Though his focus is not upon free expression, he evidently views manipulative threats
with much less concern than I do in this Article.
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threats are socially desirable or socially indifferent-and often even
when they are somewhat undesirable-they should not be made the
subject of a criminal penalty, but the reason why they should not is
sound penal policy, not free expression.
This conclusion does not establish that all manipulative threats are
outside constitutional protection. Some manipulative threats, especially
those uttered within families, may be protected by dint of some "privacy" right of intimate association. Others may be protected because
of fact-finding and line-drawing problems. Still other manipulative
threats may fall within free expression because of the conditions of
their utterance. Threats coupled with demands may be less or more
than meets the eye. Apparent threats are often rhetorical, neither seriously intended nor meant to be taken as such. One must cut through
the linguistic form of such "threats" to the actual message that the actor
intends to convey, often a strong expression of outrage or of expectation. The justifications for freedom of expression would protect these
messages. More troublesome problems arise when the threat is genuine
but also reflects powerful emotional feelings. Many people resort to
serious threats only when they are very upset; when heads become
cooler the threatener's intent to carry out the threat ceases and the prospective victim is aware that this change will take place. Of course, the
underlying emotional feelings could be expressed without the threats,
and one might argue that all that deserves protection is the untainted
expression of those feelings; but constraining spontaneous discourse is
undesirable and the law should not be too strict about proper modes of
communication. We must acknowledge that free expression is significantly implicated when threats carry with them serious expressions of
emotional feeling or strong views about the rightness or wrongness of
possible behavior by the person threatened.

D.

Warning Threats

Tim, disturbed by the fact that Vicki is selling drugs in her apartment,
decides that he will inform the police if that is necessary to get her to stop.
He tells her that she had better stop or he will do so. Afraid of being
arrested, she stops.

Reporting Vicki to the police is for Tim what I call a natural response-the step he would naturally take if she failed to stop selling
drugs. This projected course of action is not a consequence of a plan to
coerce Vicki or even of Tim's having communicated the likelihood of
his response. Again, we might imagine that for some reason Tim is
unable to communicate to Vicki his intention to go to the police if she
does not stop selling drugs. Depending on the degree of his concern for
Vicki and of his preference to have the resolution he wants without
police intervention, he may make greater or lesser efforts to let her
know his intentions before proceeding further; but if his attempts at
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communication are finally frustrated, he will go to the police. In contrast to the manipulative threat, the prospect of the threatened action
here has reality apart from Tim's utterance of the threat to take it. The
utterance, therefore, is not situation-altering;57 it affects Vicki's perception of her environment but does not actually change that environment.
Tim's informing Vicki ahead of time what he plans to do bears a
marked resemblance to a warning given by an independent third person. Yet, significant di.fferences do exist between the two. A third person does not control the unpleasant consequence that may occur and,
typically, his or her hope that that consequence will be avoided is
largely disinterested. Tim, on the other hand, does control the consequences; he is telling Vicki of action he could choose to forego. A person in Tim's circumstance is usually pursuing some interest of his own,
although self-interest could be tempered by concern for the person
threatened (Tim hopes for Vicki's sake that she will stop voluntarily
rather than be arrested) or even supplanted by such concern (Tim's
main worry is that involvement in drug sales will prove dangerous for
Vicki).
If Tim honestly reports to Vicki his likely "natural" reaction to her
failure to stop selling drugs, he communicates to her what I shall call a
"warning threat." I have said that such a threat is not "situation-altering." Is it "action-inducing"? Unlike a simple threat, the warning
threat indicates a course of action by which the person threatened may
avoid the harm. Usually, such a threat is "action-inducing." If Tim's
purpose is to get Vicki to stop voluntarily and he communicates that to
Vicki-''You'd better stop or I'll tell the police"-then the communication is designed to induce particular action. If, however, Tim does not
care whether Vicki stops voluntarily and tells her in advance about his
plans out of some sense of fairness-"Listen, I'm afraid I'll have to go
to the police if this continues"-then the communication is not actioninducing, although it undoubtedly conveys information that may affect
Vicki's behavior. In any event, the point here is that whether the communication is, in explicit content or underlying purpose, action-inducing, it does involve a statement of fact that is central to the utterance
and is covered by the justifications for freedom of expression. Here the
idea of fact is not implicit (as with many situation-altering utterances
and noncommunicative actions); nor is it subsidiary to the central purpose of the communication ("shut the door, please, you're closer than
I"); nor could the idea of fact be expressed in a manner that would
eliminate the action-inducing element, since the fact asserted is that a
kind of event will happen tf the recipient of the communication does
57 Of course, saying that one will act in a way that one plans to act will ordinarily reinforce
one's tendency to act in that way, so Tim's informing Vicki what he plans to do may increase
somewhat the chance that he will carry out the plan. More precisely, then, the communication is
not strongly situation-altering. ·
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not act in a certain way. Unlike deliberate manipulative threats, warning threats cannot simply be placed outside the boundaries of free expression. This critical distinction between manipulative and warning
threats lies at the heart of the theoretical contribution of this essay.
Threats, Expression, and the Limits of Legal Constraint
The aim of this section is to explore in greater depth the troublesome questions about legal constraint that are raised by communications about unpleasant consequences that both impinge on expression
and may be deemed socially harmful. I have distinguished between
"warnings," "simple threats," "manipulative threats," and ''warning
threats." Maintaining the assumption that we need not concern ourselves with fact-finding difficulties, I here make suggestions about the
communications that should be regarded as expression that cannot permissibly be made the subject of criminal punishment. Since the focus
of the essay is on threats coupled with demands, simple threats are
treated here only to illumine the proper conclusions about warning
threats.
Warnings by third persons uninvolved in a prospective harm58
warrant as much protection as warnings about harms, such as illness
and hurricanes, that are not caused by human agents. They should be
punishable only in the most extraordinary circumstances, as when they
constitute actual assistance in the commission of a crime59 or are made
in conflict with a valid statute that bars revelation of the particular information involved.60
Manipulative threats made in a calculated manner simply do not
involve expression in the relevant sense, and do not warrant legal protection as expression. 61 What of threats that are manipulative (in the
sense of proposing a consequence that would not be a natural reaction
to a failure to act by the victim) but are strongly expressive of emo58 A third party who was cooperating with the person who intended to inflict the harm would
not be "uninvolved."
59 Such warnings might also accompany punishable solicitation to co=it a crime.
60 How far the government may go in adopting such statutes is beyond this discussion, but I
assume that at a minimum the government can, under a properly drawn statute, punish those who
are given highly sensitive information by the government and who then disseminate the information more broadly.
61 That, of course, is not to say that all these manipulative threats should be prohibited, but
that the consideration of which to prohibit could be carried forward without regard to the special
values of expression.
In an insightful discussion of coercive threats, Edwin Baker urges that punishable coercive
utterances are those that subvert the integrity and automony of the person to whom they are
directed. Baker, Scope ef The First Amendment Freedom ef Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 9981004 (1978). While Professor Baker's analysis proceeds along different lines from my own, producing different conclusions about offers of benefits, there would be a substantial coincidence in
the instances of threats we would find to be unprotected.
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tional feeling? Some threats are rhetorical, not seriously intended.
Others hurled verbally in highly charged interchanges are meant seriously at the moment, but their force lapses quickly as tempers cool.
Since indications of strong feeling are among those communications to
which the justifications for free expression apply, and a passing intent
to manipulate by threatening an unnatural response does not pose a
serious social danger, any threat should be regarded as protected expression whatever its content if it does not convey a firm (i.e., stable)
determination to carry out the threatened harm. 62
Some manipulative threats are both emotionally expressive and
made in a manner that conveys a firm determination. Though such
threats are not devoid of expressive value and though an argument can
be made that they should enjoy greater protection than calculated manipulative threats, once a person has fixed seriously on the course of
manipulating another by threatening an unnatural response, the combined demand and threat is strongly situation-altering and should not
be viewed as protected expression.
Since warning threats-threats to engage in behavior that would
constitute a natural response to a failure to act by the person
threatened-do involve the values of expression, their proper treatment
calls for categorization that strikes some rough balance of expressive
value and social harm. The principle that no threat should be punishable unless it conveys a firm determination, of course, reaches warning
threats as well as manipulative threats, so we are concerned here only
with firm warning threats.
To think more precisely about the limits of legal constraint, we
need to attend to the action that is threatened and the action that is
demanded. If the demanded action is itself criminal, the demand constitutes solicitation of criminal behavior, solicitation that goes beyond
simple urging and provides the person threatened with an incentive
(the avoidance of unpleasant consequences) for performing the act.
Though the threat concerns a "natural" response that will follow failure to commit the crime, the demand should enjoy no more protection
than ordinary solicitation of a crime, which itself often includes significant assertions of fact. I shall not discuss the proper treatment of solicitation in detail here. 63 Briefly, solication should not be punished unless
it conveys a "fixed and potentially influential determination that the
crime be committed."64 Since the reasons behind freedom of expression apply with much greater force to public solicitation than to private
solicitation, significant further protections, including the necessity of a
6 2 If the aim is to produce instant action in response to the threat, then the evident determination to carry out the threat would not have to last a long time.
63 Criminal solicitation is the main focus of Greenawalt, supra note 40.
64 Id. at 749.

1103

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

substantial and present danger, should apply to public solicitation. 65 In
the absence of separate grounds for treating a demand and warning
threat less favorably, they should be regarded like simple requests, urgings, or demands; that is, like criminal solicitations that are unaccompanied by offers of money or manipulative threats.
Another basis for punishing a warning threat is the wrongfulness
of the harm threatened. If a man backs a demand with a warning
threat that he will commit a criminal act if his wishes are not satisfied"if you touch my sister, I will beat you up"-the demand and threat
together should enjoy no more protection than would a simple threat
that is not coupled with any demand for behavior by which the threat
may be avoided.
The court in Robertson apparently assumed that a simple threat
should be immune from criminal punishment unless either the speaker
intends to carry it out promptly, or the threat is made in a face-to-face
encounter that makes it a kind of "fighting words." 66 The opinion discerned support for this view in Watts v. United States; 61 but the
Supreme Court, there dealing with a rhetorical threat that was not seriously intended, did not indicate what status a threat that appeared serious and was intended to be taken as such would have. Cases
subsequent to Watts have generally adopted a more expansive view of
threats that are punishable than does Robertson, not demanding an actual intent to carry out the threat. 68 Many threats are made in the flush
65 Id. at 748-67.
66 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 433, 649 P.2d at 588. The Oregon court has allowed tort

recovery for infliction of mental distress caused by threats. See, e.g., Hall v. May Dep't Stores
Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981). Intent to carry out the threat presumably is not crucial in
that situation, and one should suppose genuine threats conveyed by letter would suffice.
67 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
68 In United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976), the
court sustained a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1970), based on a threat to take Yasser
Arafat's life, made over television by a member of the Jewish Defense League. Against the claim
that Kelner had no purpose to fulfill the threat, the court said that punishment might be imposed
"[s]o long as the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution. . . ." Id. at 1027. In his concurring opinion in Rogers
v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 41-48 (1975), Justice Marshall,joined by Justice Douglas, reached a
similar conclusion about 18 U.S.C. § 87l(a). Arguing against an "objective" standard, accepted
by a number of courts of appeals, that allows punishment for threats that might reasonably be
taken as serious, whether or not the speaker intends the threat seriously, Justice Marshall said, "I
believe that the statute should be construed to proscribe all threats that the speaker intends to be
interpreted as expressions of intent to kill or injure the President." Rogers v. United States, 422
U.S. at 47 (Marshall, J., concurring). A recent case adhering to the "objective" standard is United
States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462,464 (6th Cir. 1982). The objective standard and Justice Marshall's
approach unite in not demanding an intent to carry out a threat. Earlier cases construing 18
U.S.C. § 871 not to require an intent to carry out threats made against the President are collected
in Note, United States v. Kelner: Threats and the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 919,927 n.
44 (1977).
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of high emotion that can be expected to dissipate, but when threats are
made in a manner that suggests a firm purpose to carry out the harm,
they can be extremely disturbing to the prospective object of the
harm. 69 Moreover, serious threats, especially those directed at highly
prominent public persons, may call forth extensive social resources to
prevent their fulfillment, and may inhibit the activities of those subject
to the threats. Although simple threats implicate the values of expression, both because of the information they convey and because of the
emotions they reflect, they should nevertheless not be protected when a
person with apparent firmness of purpose threatens to commit a specific legal wrong that is grave enough that it will be likely to cause
substantial emotional disturbance in the person threatened or to require the employment of substantial resources of investigation or prevention.70 The balance of social harm and expression that this
conclusion reflects is influenced by a special feature that distinguishes
threats from most other communications that disturb people. The
threatened harm would be, if inflicted, a serious violation of the victim's rights. Society has a strong interest in providing people with a
sense of security that their most basic rights will not be trampled upon.
The threat that makes one feel vulnerable to just such a violation may
properly be seen as an ancillary right to be secure in one's rights. This
feature of the situation makes the speaker's claim to free expression
much weaker than it would otherwise be.71
The treatment of simple threats provides a guide for viewing
warning threats of serious harm. In fact, most threats of serious harm
coupled with demands will be manipulative threats (and therefore unprotected), since serious infringements of physical integrity or property
will not often be "natural" responses to disappointed hopes. Yet, when
a warning threat includes a threatened harm of this magnitude, the
69 Purely verbal threats are not actionable assaults under the law of torts, see W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 39-40 (4th ed. 1971), but threats have sometimes provided the
basis for recovery for the infliction of mental distress, see, e.g. , supra note 66, and federal statutes
make it criminal to convey certain threats by mail or in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 876,
§ 875(b) (1976). As the mail statute may reflect, written threats convey an appearance of firm
purpose more than most oral threats.
70 Threats against prominent public officials may be less likely to cause personal emotional
upset than threats directed at private persons, but they are more likely to necessitate careful
investigation.
7l The interest in preventing emotional distress is treated as being much less significant in the
student Note, supra note 68, at 942-43. That piece does recognize that specific intent to carry out
the harm is not highly relevant to the emotional distress of a prospective victim. Its primary
criticism of the Kelner decision is that specific intent to carry out the harm is relevant to the
likelihood that the threatened harm will take place, and that the court should have required such
intent, given its view that the interest in preventing the threatened harm underlies 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) (1976).
In a useful discussion of the issue, Franklyn Haiman concludes that Kelner's standard is
appropriate. See F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY, 217-18, 229-32 (1981).
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threat should ordinarily enjoy no greater protection than an analogous
simple threat. In other words, a serious threat such as "Leave my sister
alone or I'll kill you," should not be more protected than the statement
"I'm going to kill you." Sometimes, a threat coupled with a demand
may cause less emotional disturbance than a simple threat, because the
person to whom it is directed at least has a way to avoid the unpleasant
consequence; nevertheless, the speaker should not be able to rely on
this reaction. 72
Warning threats may also be unprotected when they constitute direct violations of substantive rights that the persons to whom they are
directed enjoy. A right to be free of racial discrimination in the pursuit
of housing may be understood to include a right not to be discouraged
from applying because of one's race. Suppose a member of a committee deciding who shall occupy a cooperative apartment says to a black:
"Don't try for an apartment in our building; if you do we shall deny
your application on some basis." This threat may be "natural"; the
residents of this cooperative may systematically find grounds for keeping blacks out. And though the threat may cause emotional distress,
that hardly seems the heart of the difficulty. The point is that telling a
potential applicant that you will discriminate is already to engage in a
form of discrimination. The action (or omission) that is likely to be
induced (the black person's failure to apply) already is at odds with the
purpose behind a ban on discrimination. I am not confident about the
extent of the principle involved, though I am clear that this communication should be viewed as unprotected.
A threatened action can be wrongful in a sense different from its
being independently a legal wrong. A policewoman may be permitted
to encourage the act she demands (a $50 donation to the P.B.A.) and
she may have authority to perform the act she threatens (arrest the person to whom she speaks),73 but she may not have the right to make her
own performance of the threatened act tum on the other person's failure to comply with her demand. By stating her willingness to make her
decision on unwarranted grounds, she invites her victim to cooperate in
her reliance upon unjustified grounds. Threats made in this context
will usually be manipulative; but even if the threat truly states a natural
response, the effort to induce behavior by an indication that one will
72 An exception to this principle is arguably warranted if the person threatened has a legal
duty to perform the demanded act. Many criminal coercion statutes, including that of Oregon, do
not punish threats designed to get people to perform their legal duties. Though this restraint may
well reflect wise penal policy, there are enough different kinds oflegal duties so that the presence
of some sort of legal duty should not be sufficient to alter the conclusion that a threat does not
warrant protection as expression.
73 Of course, if the person making the threat has no authority to arrest in the circumstances,
the act would be wrongful in a much more obvious sense.
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act improperly is already an abuse of authority, and it may be
punished.
Abuse of authority cases often involve another element present in
many other instances of coercive threats as well; accompanying a statement that one will perform the threatened act if one's demand is not
met is an explicit or implicit promise that one will not perform the act if
the demand is met.74 For example, if the police officer says, "I'm going
to arrest you unless you give me $200," she makes an implicit promise
not to make the arrest if the victim pays her the $200. 75 If an arrest
would otherwise be appropriate, a failure to arrest would be a dereliction of duty. The officer's promise is a commitment not to do what she
has a social duty76 to do. Since promises are situation-altering77 utterances outside the scope of freedom of expression, this promise is unprotected; and its antisocial character makes it an apt focus for
punishment.78
I have indicated that even though warning threats are communications of the kinds to which freedom of expression is relevant, nonethe74 The lower court in Robertson recognized this element, when it said that what the statute, in
the subsection covering disclosure of embarrassing facts, prohibits "is the conduct of compelling
another to act or refrain from acting by means of a promise toforego the threatened speech." State
v. Robertson, 54 Or. App. 630,633,635 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1981) (emphasis in original). The court
apparently assumes that every coercive threat involves such a promise, but that need not be so. A
wife whose husband is having an affair with another woman might say, for example: "I don't
know whether I will keep this a secret from your parents, but I shall certainly tell them if you
don't stop seeing her." In this setting, the power of the threat does not come from a promise not to
act, but in the indication that performance of the act is somewhat less likely if the demand is
satisfied. When the threat is formulated only in terms of the threatened action-"I'll tell your
parents if you don't stop seeing her''-whether an implicit promise is made may not always be
clear. This lack of clarity can lead to charges of bad faith if the husband does end the affair and
the wife nevertheless tells his parents what has been impairing their marriage, the husband claiming that the wife had promised to keep the secret, the wife disavowing having made any such
promise.
75 Why is the indication that one will perform the harmful act a statement of fact and not a
promise, while the indication that one will not perform constitutes a promise? The answer is that if
one refrains from harming someone, though the stated conditions for imposing the harm have
occurred, one has not broken any commitment to the victim (A, of course, might promise B to
hurt C). Promises involve what are perceived as benefits to the person to whom the promise is
given. This explains the asy=etry in the structure of many coercive threats.
76 I put the point here as a matter of social duty because when, and whether, police officers
have a legal duty to arrest in situations in which they have a legal justification to arrest is highly
controversial.
7 7 See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 681, for a brief explanation of why agreements and
promises to do wrongful acts are situation-altering.
78 Caution is needed against too broad a reliance on the point of this paragraph. The lower
court in Robertson spoke as if the punishment were generally to be imposed for a promise to
forego threatened speech. State v. Robertson, 54 Or. App. at 633, 635 P.2d at 1059. But often the
promise not to cause the harm is itself innocuous. In these instances, though the promise may not
be protected expression, the cause for concern is the explicit or implicit indication that that one
will cause the harm if the demand is not met.

1107

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

less they should not be protected in certain circumstances in which the
demand or threatened action is wrongful. What if neither the demanded act nor the threatened act is seriously wrong in the senses indicated? Can the reasons for freedom of expression be overcome here by
the desirability of preventing pressure on the victim? I think not. If the
threatener demands something that is not wrongful and the threatener
can lawfully react in the way that he says he will react, he should be
able to inform the affected person of that prospect.
A thornier problem is presented when the warning threat of a
lesser wrongful act, such as trespass, is not likely to create emotional
disturbance and the threat itself does not initiate a denial of rights, as
in the cooperative housing example. One might take the view that any
threat to do a legal wrong can itself be punished, but that resolution
would plainly be unacceptable for simple threats. Suppose someone
tells a neighbor whose children have played on his property that he will
ruin the neighbor's lawn, or suppose someone is so incensed at his
treatment by the Internal Revenue Service that he writes a letter to the
District Director saying that in future years he will fail to file a return.
These statements should be regarded as expression enjoying immunity
from criminal punishment. I believe the same conclusion applies if the
threats are coercive: "Stop your children or I'll ruin your lawn," "Give
me my refund or I'll refuse to file." In such instances the threats themselves do little or no direct harm, and criminal enforcement must be left
for the occasion when an actual attempt is made to commit the wrongful act.
Constitutional Principles for Coercive Threats

We now reach the question of how the principles suggested thus
far can be translated into guidelines for constitutional protection, an
exercise that requires attention to line-drawing and fact-finding difficulties. Here I drop my assumption of perfect knowledge of facts. My
claim is that although some important adjustments are required, the
underlying distinctions drawn in this essay serve as appropriate bases
for constitutional standards.
Alternative Approaches .-Before proceeding to that task, I should
address explicitly arguments that the whole exercise is misguided, or is
misconceived in some important aspect. One objection might go something like this: however persuasive the analysis so far has been about
the deep philosophical implications underlying protected expression,
the communications that the constitutional provisions protect bear little
relation to the subtle categories academics are able to create.
In one form, the argument might rely on historical studies like Le-
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onard Levy's79 to determine that the aim behind the first amendment
was much more modest than to protect all expression that might be
protected under some modem theory of expression; that perhaps the
free speech clause was intended only to preclude prior restraints (which
are not involved in punishment of criminal coercion). A similar approach to the Oregon provisions would, of course, have to take into
account changes in ideas about expression that preceded 1859; but one
might conclude that whether one looked to popular opinion or legal
and political writers, ideas about free expression remained less expansive than they are now. I shall not try here to defend an approach to
interpretation that is more activist in respect to the framers' judgments
than a rigorous attempt to assess whether they would have deemed a
practice protected. Narrow reference to historical intent has long been
abandoned by the Supreme Court (and other courts) in regard to freedom of speech, and my own view is that attempts to rely exclusively on
such references are unworkable and unwise.
A second form of this objection against my approach takes a more
expansive view of constitutional protections of speech, suggesting that
the provisions in question reach a much broader range of communications than the philosophical justifications for expression might suggest.
A reason for this breadth might be said to be that the drafters wanted
to make sure that all speech deserving protection got protection and
wanted to immunize the boundaries of protection from the shifting
sands of academic and judicial discourse about the rationales for free
expression.
This general argument, which may well reflect the implicit underlying premises of the Robertson opinion, must rest on one or more of
the three following strands. The first strand is the constitutional language. The federal language is ambiguous perhaps, but its reference to
the freedom of speech lends itself more comfortably to the view that
historical protections of speech were to be continued and entrenched
than to the view that all human utterances not then punished were presumptively protected. The Oregon provision80 does say that "No law
shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting
the right to speak . . . freely on any subject," but it also goes on to say
that "every person shall be responsible for the abuse ofthis right." The
state supreme court interprets the first clause very broadly, apparently
construing the language of the last clause to permit civil recovery for
some speech that cannot be criminally punished;81 but the language
?9 L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION (1963). Levy's narrow interpretation of the interrelated scope of the free press clause
has recently been challenged in Anderson, The Origins ofthe Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455
(1983).
80 See supra note 9.
81 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 412, 649 P.2d at 576.
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lends itself at least as well to a construction that bars prior restraints,
and perhaps subsequent punishment of some speech, but permits criminal as well as civil responsibility for speech that "abuses" the right.
Thus, I conclude that neither the federal nor state language points decisively in favor of broader protection than would be derived from the
underlying rationales for expression.
A second strand in the argument for such protection could be evidence of historical intent outside the confines of the constitional language; but I am aware of no evidence that supports broader protection
than is supported by the underlying justifications for free expression.
The third strand is that broader protection is the only workable
approach for purposes of legislative drafting and judicial review, and
that only it will yield adequate protection of speech over the long run.
Given the inconclusiveness of the constitutional language and historical intent, this third strand is the critical one for the argument in favor
of broader protection against criminal penalties. This strand relies on
some broad "policy" judgments to reject judicial analysis of "policy" in
particular free speech cases. Whether those judgments are sound depends considerably on the workability of an approach that is more
closely tied to the justifications for expression. This essay, and particularly the next part of this section, are a test of one such approach.
There is an alternative to my approach that is more expansionist
than mine in one respect, but that need not be fundamentally at odds
with much of the effort in this essay or with the great majority of its
practical conclusions about constitutional protection. I shall briefly
sketch some versions of that alternative and my reasons for rejecting
them. The basic core of the alternative is that every kind of verbal or
written utterance must be viewed as reached by constitutional protection unless adequate reasons exist for denying protection. 82 The premise underlying this core might be a claim about the breadth of
constitutional language or framers' intent. But it might also lie in a
view that all utterances do have some value as expression, or in a view
that organs of government cannot appropriately distinguish those that
have no (or insufficient) value. Since I concede both the difficulties of
line-drawing and the presence of implicit assertions of fact and value in
situation-altering utterances, proponents of both these views could actually claim some support in what I have said.
Whether this alternative is practically as well as formally different
from my own suggestions depends on how it is conceived. Suppose
that once a kind of utterance is tentatively placed within the range of
protection, it can then be displaced simply on the basis that it does not
significantly involve the values of expression. In that event, the differ82 Defense of some form of this alternative highlighted the co=ents of Franklyn Haiman
and Steven Shiffrin about my paper during the Symposium.
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ence from my approach is purely formal. I agree that all kinds of utterances must be carefully examined to see if they implicate the values of
expression, though I make that examination part of the inquiry
whether they count as expression. Under the alternative, all utterances
count, in some sense, as expression but lose any claim to protection if
they do not really involve the values of expression. The process of examination and the result are the same: categories of utterances that do
not significantly implicate the values of expression are deemed unprotected without any inquiry whether the utterances engender significant
social costs. Compared with this account of the alternative, my approach delineates in a clearer conceptual form the distinction between
nonprotection of utterances because of their insignificant value as expression, and a genuine balancing that requires a strong social need to
suppress utterances that do count as expression. My approach also
comes closer, I think, to capturing the conceptions of speech that underlie the drawing of the constitutional provisions.
The alternative becomes practically as well as formally different
from my approach if the alternative encompasses any of the following
positions: (1) Once a kind of utterance is classed as expression at all, or
once it is identified as having even the slightest value as expression, a
genuine balancing test (presumably of a "categorical" sort) is triggered,
the state having to meet something more than the minimal "rational
basis" standard in order to prohibit expression; (2) All expression must
be protected unless the state meets a very stringent standard; (3) In no
event can the comparative value of different kinds of expression be
considered; (4) Each utterance must be examined on its own to determine its value as expression rather than placed in some rough category.
Acceptance of the view that all utterances count as expression plus
acceptance of the second or third position would be in stark contrast to
my approach. A major aspect of my argument is that some kinds of
utterances do not really involve the value of expression in a significant
way, and that these utterances deserve much less protection than assertions of fact and value. For this reason, counting all kinds of utterances
as equally deserving of protection or subjecting them all to a stringent
test would be unwarranted. Indeed, if the courts treated all utterances
as equally deserving of protection, the predictable result would be covert evaluation of the benefits of different forms of utterance; if a formally "stringent" standard governed the regulation of all utterances;
courts would water down that "stringent" standard, at least when applied to those utterances deemed to have little communicative value.
The first position, that some balance must be struck so long as any
kind of utterance, or any kind with any expressive value, is involved, is
more compatible with my main claims. This position leaves open the
possibility that utterances with less expressive value can be suppressed
upon a less powerful showing of need, and thus permits use of the dis1111
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tinctions I draw between kinds of utterances. Indeed, this position
might be viewed as more sensitive to all relevant considerations than
my own approach, because it permits assessment of degrees of expressive value, and a weighing that takes into account those degrees of
value, as well as degrees in the social costs engendered by different
types of utterances. My objections to this position are the following.
With respect to some kinds of utterances, including many situationaltering utterances, the expressive value is not different in quality or
amount from the expressive value of many "ordinary" actions that do
not involve utterance at all. That expressive value is not sufficient to
trigger some free speech balancing process for all these ordinary actions, nor should it be sufficient simply because the kind of action involved happens to be a kind of utterance. A scheme that requires a
balance for all kinds of utterances with any expressive value either becomes a kind of charade, or places excessive demands on courts. It becomes a charade if courts say that slight expressive value is enough to
trigger a test slightly more stringent than rational basis, but end up
sustaining virtually any government reason for suppression. It places
excessive demands on courts if they seriously try to compare the
strength of the state's need with the expressive value of a broad range
of classes of utterance. A critical practical objection to this position is
that it envisions a great number of claims that would be treated as initially valid assertions of free speech protection that are outweighed by
fairly pale government showings of need. Such "weak" free speech
tests might well start to spill over to cases in which the expressive value
of utterances is genuinely significant and stringent protection has always been required. Thus, it may be seen that excluding some utterances from the ambit of expression may actually help to safeguard
protection of utterances that are squarely within that ambit. 83
As far as the fourth position-the point about categorization-is
concerned, my claim is that the categories I draw in this essay are an
indispensable aid to understanding the expressive value of particular
utterances, and that they provide a fair basis for evaluation in particular cases.
Translating Important .Distinctions into Constitutional Standards.My own attempt to translate principles of expression into constitutional
guidelines begins with rhetorical threats and threats that may be seriously intended at the moment they are uttered, but do not reveal a firm
determination. Such threats should be constitutionally immune from
punishment, apparent firmness of purpose being regarded as a requisite
for treating any coercive threat as criminal.
83 See Schauer, Speech and "Speech" -Obscenity and "Obscenity'~· An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 61 GEo. L. J. 899, 907-08 (1979). Professor Schauer made
the same point orally during the Northwestern Symposium.
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I have suggested that deliberate manipulative threats are not covered by the justifications for free expression, and that firm but emotionally intense manipulative threats should also be reqarded as
unprotected, though they do implicate values of expression. Warning
threats, on the other hand, are not situation-altering and are reached
more strongly by the justifications for expressi~n; they should be protected unless they involve a demand to engage in criminal behavior or
a threatened action or demand that is seriously wrongful in one of the
ways described. Translating all these principles into constitutional
guidelines requires clearer specification of the kinds of situations that
will fall in the protected and unprotected categories. This section attempts to clarify the categories and to resolve line-drawing and factfinding difficulties.
The exact line between manipulative threats and threats of natural
responses is impossible for outsiders to draw, since the crucial question
is how the threatener would have responded to a rejected request or
demand if she had not made the threat, and an outsider often may not
be able to answer that question with certainty. Even the threatener
may not always be sure how she would have responded to a failure to
satisfy a demand if she had not also made the threat. Especially in
emotionally intense situations, demands, threats, and possible responses often pop into our heads at the same time. What the law can
reasonably ask is whether the response is of the kind that would be
natural if the person who is actually threatened had refused to perform
the desired act after a simple request or demand unaccompanied by a
threat. Interestingly, in almost every case hypothesized by the Oregon
court the responses would be natural in this sense. The court referred,
for example, to "situations in which one man tells another: 'If you
don't quit making love to my wife, I'm going to tell your wife,' or someone proposes to disclose an airline pilot's secret illness ifhe does not get
medical attention, or a politician's embarrassing past if he does not
withdraw his candidacy from office." 84 In each instance the threatened
act represents a "natural" next step if a request or demand is not satisfied. Other threats, ("Pay me $500 or I will put a bomb in your store")
are obviously not warnings of natural responses.
If the response would be natural for many people, it should be
considered natural; juries or judges should not be in the position of
making impossible guesses about how a particular person might have
acted had he or she not made the threat. 85 Similarly, if the threatened
84 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 418, 649 P.2d at 580.
85 An exception might be made if convincing evidence exists that the threat was manipulative
for the person involved (suppose, for example, that the threatener has told acquaintances that he is
trying to frighten the victim and has no intent to engage in the threatened behavior), but I am
inclined to reject this possible exception as creating unnecessary complexity. Since threats of serious wrongs and demands of criminal acts can be punished whether the threat is manipulative or
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response is not one in which people (or some recognizable subset of
people) would commonly engage, it should be regarded as manipulative, although a person who has made a threat should be able to show
that a response is natural for him (e.g., he produces evidence that he
has responded in such a way when no threat was involved). 86
A different sort of question about the link between manipulative
and warning threats involves the possible application of repeated unpleasant consequences to achieve a particular result. We need to imagine that Tim has decided that he will harass Vicki by playing his stereo
loud every evening until she stops selling drugs in her apartment. This
in itself would not be a natural response to Vicki's actions; Tim would
have no interest in playing his stereo loud unless he saw that as a
means for altering Vicki's behavior.
Suppose that Tim first plays the stereo very loud one evening and
then tells Vicki, "You see, that is my response to your selling drugs."
This message in form is a statement of a past or present motivation for
action rather than a threat; but it implicitly conveys an indication that
future loud playing will depend on whether the sale of drugs continues.
If that implication is clear, the message should be regarded as a manipulative threat, since Tim would not continue this course of action if
unable to communicate its significance to Vicki.
Suppose that instead of first playing the stereo, Tim tells Vicki that
he has decided to play the stereo loud in order to discourage her from
selling drugs. Given Tim's reason for playing the stereo, this message
implicitly lets Vicki know that she can prevent that consequence by
agreeing to stop the sale of drugs. Thus, however phrased, this is a
threat coupled with a demand. Is the threat warning or manipulative?
The argument that it is only a warning threat goes as follows. Tim has
already decided to play the stereo loud at least one evening. He would
do that even if he was unable to communicate with Vicki beforehand;
so his initial threat is not situation-altering; it merely warns Vicki of
what will happen anyway. The argument that the threat is manipulawarning, very few prosecutions are likely to be brought when a threat that does not have either of
these characteristics involves a threatened action that appears to be a natural response.
86 There is a stronger argument for an individualized claim here than when the prosecution
seeks tci prove that an apparently natural response was not natural, see supra note 85. The first
reason is that in this instance, the defendant is seeking to bring himself under the umbrella of
constitutional protection. The second reason is that prosecution of threats that appear to be manipulative, but are not, is more likely than prosecution of threats that appear to be warning
threats, but are not.
A possible objection to the exception proposed here is that it would reward people of vicious
disposition who "naturally" respond in highly unpleasant ways. The issue here, however, is the
relevance of freedom of expression, and my position is that informing someone of the outlets of
one's vicious disposition is expression in a way that making up an unpleasant reaction and using it
as a threat is not. This analysis, it must be remembered, provides no protection for the unpleasant
act that is threatened, nor does it offer protection for the threats of natural responses that I have
indicated can appropriately be punished.
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tive rests on the manipulative nature of the course of conduct and the
necessity that Tim communicate at some stage the significance of his
conduct if that conduct is to have any point at all. Trying to decide at
what stage Tim would need to communicate in order to continue the
conduct would be highly artificial. For that reason and because of the
close linkage between the initial communication and Tim's manipulative plans, the threats should be treated like manipulative threats.
This determination, however, does not settle all questions of constitutional protection about repeated acts of pressure. In the ordinary
situation in which a single harm, say disclosure of embarrasing information, is threatened, a judgment may reasonably be made that the
harm itself is socially acceptable, but that a threat to engage in it coupled with a demand puts socially unacceptable pressure on the victim
to comply with the demand. If the threatened behavior is itself an attempt to pressure the victim, the analysis is different. That pressuring
course of conduct may be deemed socially acceptable or even constitutionally protected, as are some boycotts under the first amendment
freedom of association. 87 If the conduct is deemed appropriate or protected, the communication that precedes the first practical steps should
be deemed constitutionally protected, since it would be senseless to encourage persons to proceed to apply pressure without their being initially able to inform the prospective subjects of that pressure about
what is going to happen.
A final problem that merits brief discussion concerns warning
· threats in which the threatened harm may cause emotional disturbance
or trigger the expenditure of investigative and preventive social resources. The problem is how the line is to be drawn between protected
threats and unprotected threats. Plainly the test of criminal behavior
should not depend on whether a particular individual is upset or on
whether some public official happens to worry enough about the threat
to have it investigated or to have steps taken to prevent its being
brought to fruition. The constitutional test might be cast in terms of
what the maker of the communication could reasonably expect; but a
standard of likely emotional disturbance or expenditure of social resources is too vague for fair and predictable application. A sensible and
much more precise surrogate would be whether the threatened behavior involves a felony against an individual's physical well-being, liberty, or property.
Given these modest accommodations to meet fact-finding and
line-drawing problems, the standards suggested for when coercive
threats warrant protection can be used as appropriate constitutional
guidelines. If a threat shows a firm determination, and the threatened
response is not natural, the threat should not enjoy constitutional pro87 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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tection. 88 If a threat shows firm determination and the response is natural, the threat would enjoy protection, but only if it meets the criteria
for protection outlined. If a threat does not evidence a firm determination, it would be constitutionally protected.
Lest some of the distinctions drawn in this essay are thought too
elusive or complicated to be profitably employed in constitutional interpretation, putting them in a realistic context may prove helpful.
Criminal coercion is not a frequently prosecuted crime, and its content
overlaps considerably with the crimes of extortion and blackmail.
Most of the threats that will be prosecuted will be obviously manipulative, as were the Robertson defendants' threats to send compromising
photographs to their victim's parents. And most cases in which any
doubt is raised on this score may be ones in which the threatened harm
is serious enough so that even warning threats are punishable. Thus,
the more troublesome borderline cases are unlikely to perplex the
courts with great frequency.
Though I do not here develop any full theory of how constitutional protections of expression should be interpreted, 89 I note that the
standards proposed here not only serve fundamental values presently
perceived as underlying constitutional restraints on legislative interference with expression, but also are compatible with the open-ended language of relevant clauses, with the general conceptions of expression
that the framers accepted, and with existing cases.
Few coercion cases actually discuss problems of expression at any
length, 90 so to claim that this approach is compatible with the cases is
to say only that it does not contradict what most courts have decided.
One fairly extensive, if somewhat confusing, body of law is closely
analogous analytically to the issue of criminal coercion: the principles
governing what employers and union officials may say prior to voting
by employees over joining a union. 91 The National Labor Relations
Act protects the expression of views,92 but speech that coerces employees or interferes with their exercise of rights constitutes an unfair labor
practice. 93 Construing the act and the applicability of the first amend8 8 The conclusion would hold even if the threatened act itself is constitutionally protected, or
is imposed by some kind of legal duty.
89 In Greenawalt, supra note 40, I make a more systematic attempt to relate constitutional
interpretation to more general theories about the scope of freedom of expression.
90 See, e.g., Note, supra note 68, at 927-28 n.47 (citing cases involving convictions for coercive
threats under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1976)).
91 See Williams, .Distinguishing Protectedfrom Unprotected Campaign Speech, 33 LAB. L.J. 265
(1982).
92 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
93 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(I) & 158(b)(I) (1976). The NLRB may set aside elections even though
the speech involved does not amount to an unfair labor practice, see Williams, supra note 91, at
265 n.3.

1116

78:1081 (1983)

Criminal Coercion

ment, the Supreme Court said in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co .94 that
employers may warn of likely economic consequences outside their
control or about a fixed decision to close a plant upon unionization, but
may not make threats of economic reprisal to be taken of their own
volition. The development of that distinction by the National Labor
Relations Board and the courts of appeals95 makes clear that virtually
anything that fits into the category of manipulative threats would be
unprotected.96 Many warning threats about (legally permissible) responses an employer might make to unionization, and even some warnings about what third parties such as crucial customers might do, have
been held to be unprotected, the view being that loose talk by employers will be taken by employees as more threatening than its literal import might suggest. In many instances, apparent predictions of likely
consequences have been held to be threats because they lack a convincing objective basis. Though the cases reveal a purpose to protect plain
statements of fact and unvarnished opinions about unionization and to
leave unprotected intimations of future behavior that employees will
consider threatening, the decisions plainly place the employer under
much greater restraint than I have suggested would generally be appropriate under the first amendment. 97 The courts obviously regard labormanagement relations as a special area. Whether the constraints on
pre-election speech can be justified by the employer's economic leverage over employees, the close federal regulation of other aspects of
union elections and of the whole course of labor-management relations, and the strong policy in favor of free decisions about unionization, is beyond the scope of this essay; but I can confidently assert that
the principles of these cases should not be made the foundation for a
general approach to constitutionally protected speech.
My primary purpose in this essay is to clarify understanding about
coercive threats, and that clarification can prove valuable even if my
specific suggestions about constitutional protections are not accepted.
One might, for example, believe that enough threats are warning
threats warranting protection so that all coercive threats should be pro9 4 395 U.S. 575, 618-19, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). See Textile Workers v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 n.20 (1965).
95 See Williams, supra note 91.
96 I say "virtually anything" because an employer may perhaps, consistent with Gissel, make a
firm decision to close a plant upon unionization and so inform workers, even though the reason
for the firm decision is to discourage a vote for the union. Obviously the Supreme Court does not
suppose this is a very likely course of events.
97 The law's development is criticized for being at odds with free speech principles in Williams, supra note 91, at 280-81. Cf. R. EPSTEIN, A COMMON LAW FOR LABOR RELATIONS: A
CRITIQUE OF THE NEW DEAL LABOR LEGISLATION, 44-47 (1983) (attacking existing restraints as
unjustified by any proper notion of coercion). Williams' discussion of union speech, Williams,
supra note 91, at 276-80, suggests that the Board has been somewhat more permissive in respect to
union speech than in respect to employer speech.
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tected, subject perhaps to certain limited qualifications. Or one might
believe that a legislature (at least as far as freedom of expression is
concerned) can permissibly prohibit all coercive threats, since so many
of them are not expression in the relevant sense and many of the others
do not deserve protection. Either of these approaches (and others)
could be defended as consonant with my fundamental analytical
claims, though I should regard the approaches as less sound constitutionally than the one I have outlined.
The Special Problem of Unsuccessful Coercive Threats

I have not focused in my discussion on the success of a coercive
threat, and that omission is not inadvertent. Whether the threat is protected expression is not related to whether it succeeds. Likelihood of
success may have some bearing on the decision whether an apparent
threat is rhetorical or fails to convey a firm determination. Likelihood
of success may also be relevant if the demanded act is criminal, since in
some circumstances, the punishability of criminal solicitation may depend on the chances that the urging to commit a criminal act will be
acted upon quickly. Actual success may have an important evidentiary
bearing on whether success was reasonably likely from the threatener's
point of view, but it should have no constitutional significance beyond
this.
Since the previous paragraph runs contrary to what the court in
Robertson said or implied, I shall examine the opinion's apparent
premises in this regard. The court, it will be recalled, said that because
the coercion statute is not directed "against forbidden speech as
such,"98 its enactment is not wholly outside legislative authority. Had
the enactment been against forbidden speech as such, it could be sustained only if it fell within some established historical exception to constitutional protection. 99 What makes the enactment not against
forbidden speech as such is that it is directed at a forbidden effect. 100 A
criminal coercion statute that made the mere communication of a coercive threat the subject of punishment 101 would presumably be subject
to invalidation on the court's premises.
The court's approach casts doubt on the crime of attempted crimiState v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 415, 649 P.2d at 578.
Id. at 412, 649 P.2d at 576.
100 Id. at 417,649 P.2d at 579. The court also talks of the law as directed against "the pursuit
or accomplishment of a forbidden results... ."Id.at 415, 416-17, 649 P.2d at 578-79. This language might be taken to mean that so long as communication seeks a forbidden effect, its prohibition is not against "speech as such." That understanding would avoid the problem about attempts
discussed in the text, but that understanding would also treat a prohibition on criminal solicitation
as not being against speech as such. The court in Robertson clearly indicates its view that criminal
solicitation provisions are against speech as such, and are valid only because they fit within an
historical exception to protected expression. Id. at 412, 649 P.2d at 576.
IOI The Model Penal Code provision,§ 212.5 (1980) (reproduced i,!Ji-a note 103), is an example.
98
99
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nal coercion, even if the statutory definition of completed criminal coercion satisfies constitutional standards. The attempt involves no
element other than the proscribed communication, and thus the crime
of attempted coercion is directed at speech as such. If the crime of
criminal coercion reaches more broadly than the category of successful
coercive threats historically punishable, then correspondingly the reach
of attempted criminal coercion would be broader than the historical
reach of attempted criminal coercion. The crime of attempted criminal
coercion might thus run afoul of the court's rule that the only communications that can be punished as such are those within historical exceptions to a general umbrella of protection. 102 An alternative
understanding is that although criminal coercion is largely new, attempt is a traditional form of liability, and that any attempt, even one
by communication, to commit a valid crime can be prohibited. The
problem with this view is that an attempt of the crime of criminal coercion will always be by communication and it would be odd to permit
the legislature to do indirectly (by creating a substantive crime that requires success and making unsuccessful attempts also criminal) what
the court in Robertson indicated it could not do directly (forbidding
communications of this sort whether successful or not).
The suggestions that success can be crucial to whether a communication is protected expression and that making success an element of
the crime can be crucial to whether a legislative prohibition of criminal
coercion can survive are not responsive to genuine concerns about free
expression. As I have indicated, the quality of a communication does
not depend on its success. Moreover, if the basic justification for a very
strict rule when the legislature prohibits "speech as such" is that legislators should not be deciding which communications are socially harmful, this concern is not relevant when all the legislature does is to
extend the coverage of a permissibly defined crime to include unsuccessful efforts to commit the crime in which communication happens to
be the central element that will then be exhibited alone. And it should
make no difference whether this extension is accomplished by a
broader definition of the underlying offense or the application of a general attempt provision.
102 I confess to some uncertainty about how much difference the Oregon court thinks it makes
whether a criminal prohibition is against speech as such or is directed at a forbidden effect with
speech as an element of the crime. In the first instance, communication can be punished only if
within an historically understood exception. Apparently the legislature has some broader power
to enlarge on historical crimes in the second instance, but the court in Robertson did not suggest
how great this broader power is, and it gave much emphasis to the historical boundaries of punishable coercive threats in deciding which successful coercive threats are constitutionally protected
against criminal punishment.
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LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, 0VERBREADTH AND COERCION STATUTES

My main interest in this essay is not whether the Oregon Supreme
Court rightly invalidated the state's criminal coercion provision; certainly the literal language of the statute could be understood to reach
many instances of threats that would be constitutionally protected
under the analysis I advance, as well as under the court's own analysis.
But I do wish to comment briefly on what an acceptable statute might
look like and on whether my analysis provides avenues for a saving
interpretation of a statute even as broad as Oregon's.
Though a legislature considering an expansive provision covering
threats would reasonably want to prohibit some warning threats, it
might profitably focus on the distinction between manipulative threats
and warning threats when it reaches demanded and threatened actions
that are not themselves wrongful. We could not, of course, expect present legislation to make the precise distinction between these threats
since that has not yet been focused upon in legal discourse. What
might be hoped for is some sort of rough distinction in relevant contexts between the "unnatural" respoil,~es that accompany many manipulative threats and the "natural" responses associated with warning
threats.
It is instructive that the Model Penal Code provision bears an approximation to this approach. That provision, 103 which the Oregon
court cited as creating much broader privileges than its own state provision, 104 was drafted to accord with sound penal policy and not in response to any perceived implications of free expression. 105 The
The Model Code provides, in part:
Criminal coercion: (1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of crinlinal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to his detriment, he threatens to:
(a) commit any crinlinal offense; or
{b) accuse anyone of a crinlinal offense; or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to
inlpair his credit or business repute; or
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) that the
actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and
that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to
the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official
action, as by desisting from further misbehavior, making good a wrong done, refraining from
taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes the other disqualified.
(2) Grading. Crinlinal coercion is a misdemeanor unless the threat is to commit a felony or
the actor's purpose is felonious, in which cases the offense is a felony of the third degree.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 212.5 (1980).
104 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. at 431, 436, 649 P.2d at 587, 590. The court was careful not to
express a view on whether the Model Code's privileges make the provision constitutionally
acceptable.
105 Neither the original commentary, MODEL PENAL CODE 8-9 (fentative Draft No. 11, 1960),
nor the revised commentary, Id. Part II, at 263-270 (1980) (commentary on § 212.5), make any
reference to freedom of expression.
103
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demands that the Model Code reaches 106 are defined about as expansively as those covered by Oregon's provision, 107 except that the Model
Code, with the language "to his detriment," excludes demands (such as
refraining from drinking) that are designed to promote the welfare of
the person threatened.
The Model Code does not make liability tum on whether a threat
is successful. Its categories of forbidden threats are (a) committing a
criminal offense, (b) accusing someone of a criminal offense, (c) exposing "any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute," and (d) taking or
withholding action as an official or causing an official to do so. The
drafters consciously refrained from expanding the categories of threats
to the breadth reached in the crime of extortion, believing that for the
much wider goals covered by criminal coercion, only threats "generally
regarded as illegitimate" should be covered. 108
A crucial difference between the Model Code and the Oregon provision lies in the scope of the former' s privileges. Like Oregon, the
Model Code grants no privilege for threats to commit a criminal offense. Both because threats to commit crimes will usually be "manipulative" and because threats to commit serious crimes would be
punishable in any event, threats to commit crimes may usually be punished under my analysis. However, I would protect threats to engage in
"naturally" responsive behavior involving minor criminality, such as
political action that would violate laws governing trespass or disorderly
conduct. The Model Code provides a privilege for those who threaten
to accuse someone of a crime or expose a secret if they believe the
accusation or exposed fact to be true and have a purpose "limited to
compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation [or] exposure
. . . ." The text provides as examples getting people to stop misbehavior, redress wrongs, and refrain from taking actions or responsibilities
for which they are unqualified. A similar privilege exists for threats
about official action. Thus, the privilege depends on a nexus between
the threat and the demand, and on the demand being for some action
the threatener believes is reasonable. This privilege, in fact, covers a
substantial proportion of "warning threats." What it leaves unprotected are threats of "natural" responses for which the person making
106 The actor's purpose must be "unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to his detriment .•.." MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(1980). According to the commentary, the "word
'unlawfully' means that the actor must intend to coerce conduct that he has no legal right to
require." MODEL PENAL CODE, Part II, at 265 (commentary on§ 212.5).
107 A person was guilty under OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275 (1981) for compelling or inducing
"another person to engage in conduct from which he has a legal right to abstain, or to abstain
from engaging in conduct in which he has a legal right to engage . . . ."
108 MODEL PENAL CODE, Part II, at 266-67 (commentary on§ 212.5).
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the threat has no such justification. For example, however unpraiseworthy the behavior may be, jilted lovers do sometimes try to
undermine new relationships their former partners have entered. Suppose Joan, out of desperation, says to Doug, "If you don't stop seeing
Amy, I'll tell Amy about your alcohol problem." This instance would
not be privileged under the Model Code, but it would be protected expression under the principles I have suggested.
In sum, to a very considerable extent the Model Code section affords a privilege to coercive threats that warrant constitutional protection. As the provision stands, the overbreadth is probably limited
enough so that a state statute adopting its exact language should be
sustained against a facial challenge.
A legislature, such as Oregon's, that is tackling the job fresh could
achieve a better fit between statutory language and the protection of
expression I have urged. It might well consider narrowing the categories of forbidden threats as the Model Code does, but if it chooses a
formulation that in its basic structure is as broad as that struck down in
Robertson, it should still be able to save the statute against an overbreadth challenge by creation of a privilege to cover instances of protected threats. The statutory language could, for example, explicitly
state:
No communication shall be considered a forbidden effort to coerce under
this section if either:
(I) the communication does not convey firm determination to commit the
threatened action, or
(2) (a) the threatened action is a natural response to the other person's
failure to do what the person making the communication wants, and
(b) the demanded action is not criminal, the threatened action is not
a felony against an individual or his property, and the combination of
demand and threat do not involve an abuse of authority or directly violate a civil right.

No doubt this language could be improved upon, and the way a legislature phrases the privilege would properly depend on how the underlying crime is defined. Nevertheless, this draft privilege should be ample
to show how a legislature could be sensitive to the values of expression
and try to meet the prospect of an overbreadth attack.
The Oregon statute considered by the court in Robertson did not,
of course, contain any such broad privilege, and, read as widely as the
court in Robertson read it, its overbreadth was far greater than that
found in the Model Code. The Oregon statute reached many more
kinds of threats than the Model Code and only a subsection relating to
threats to accuse people of crimes contained a privilege analogous to
that of the Model Code. 109 The court's invalidation of the provision
could comfortably be defended, even were my analysis of the basic is109 OR. REV. STAT.§ 163.285 (1981).
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sues about protected expression wholly substituted for that found in the
opinion. On the other hand, the court might have reconstructed the
statute while remaining generally faithful to the legislative purpose, but
without either completely rewriting the statute or leaving undue openendedness. Two of the broadest threats covered by the Oregon statute
are (a) to expose a secret that would tend to subject a person to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, and (b) to inflict any harm which would not benefit the actor. 110 The basic language of the statute covers someone who
complies or induces conduct "by means of instilling . . . a fear that, if
the demand is not complied with, the actor . . . will . . . ." 111 When
this language is joined with threats of such breadth, one reasonable
reading would be that warning threats are not attempts to compel behavior by instilling fear, but rather give the "victim" a more complete
account of the relevant factors for decision. In relation to these subsections, then, the statute might be construed as covering only obviously
manipulative threats, which I claim do not enjoy constitutional protection. One difficulty with this reading, which I should acknowledge, is
that as to other subsections, especially those involving threats of criminal conduct, the restriction to manipulative threats may be strained.
Such a reading might nevertheless have been adopted across the board
to save the statute; or the court might have candidly acknowledged that
the significance of the same introductory language could vary depending on the clauses that follow it.
I shall not try to work out this possible strategy for saving the statute in any more detail, or try to address the difficulties connected with
other subsections. Certainly this approach has its own problems, and a
court might sensibly decide, as the court in Robertson did, to remit the
matter to the legislature. But what I do want to stress is that the overbreadth problem does take on quite a different look if this alternative
analysis of the basic issue about freedom of expression is accepted.
CONCLUSION

This attempt to work through the relationship of coercive threats
and freedom of expression has revealed the essential wisdom of the
traditional, if often unarticulated, view that most serious threats either
have little to do with expression, properly understood, or are punishable despite their involving some degree of expression. Nonetheless,
other threats, mainly those of "natural" responses, should be viewed as
constitutionally protected; and Justice Linde's opinion in Robertson is
sound in its essential premise that criminal coercion statutes must be
carefully reviewed from the perspective of free expression.
At a more abstract level, this essay is an illustration of the impor110 See supra note 3.
111 Id.
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tance of thought about the boundaries of free expression. It also reflects my further belief, not here defended explicitly, that various
problems of expression require various strategies of analysis, that no
single test or formulation should be imposed on issues of immense
complexity and diversity. 112
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